As promised…
I’m going to try hard not to overreact. I’m going to try to stay away from hyperbole. I’m simply going to try and think through what the results of 2008 South Carolina, and the aftereffects, mean.
What truly matters to me in the final analysis is not that Fred Thompson was rejected, but who the primary voters of SC selected over him, and possible reasons why they did so. And the result is that I now must seriously entertain the idea that the Reagan Coalition is indeed no more, and that the future of conservatism as a movement and the future of the Republican Party as a political organization are both in flux.
There are three things about the SC primary results that are simply striking to me.
1. Fred Lost
There are some who remain optimistic, who believe that in this strange year, anything is possible and that Fred Thompson could remain viable somehow — perhaps involving a brokered convention, etc. That’s all fine and good, but such optimism cannot obscure the fact that Fred Thompson lost, and lost big. He got beat pretty badly by McCain and Huckabee both.
Why did he lose? Especially when it appeared that everyone up and down the Republican Party invariably agreed with Fred on the positions, and further agreed that he was the most consistently, across-the-board conservative in the field?
Well, the answer usually is some form of “Fred rocks, but his campaign sucks”. This is the criticism most often levelled at Thompson: we agree and believe in him, but his campaign just didn’t get it done. Whether it’s a criticism of the organization, a criticism of the candidate, or a criticism of timing, fact is that many SC Republicans voted against Fred not because of his positions, but in spite of them. We can talk about electability, about leadership, about discipline, about “fire in the belly”… whatever term you want to use. But the point is that the SC electorate punished Fred for failing to execute.
There are, of course, some very good reasons to do so. As many have pointed out, if you can’t sell the message, then it doesn’t matter what the message is. However it happened, Thompson was seen as being unable to get the message out.
2. Voters went for Huckabee and McCain
The second salient fact is that in rejecting Fred Thompson — the candidate who just didn’t get it done — 30% of the voters of SC went for Huckabee, and 33% went for McCain. This is significant for slightly different reasons, but nonetheless significant.
McCain’s problems with the conservative base is so well-known that even Fox News commentators talk about it. They say that he needs to extend a branch to conservatives, and have a Come to Jesus moment on McCain-Feingold (among other issues). McCain’s own supporters have problems with some of his record on illegal immigration, on Gang of 14, on McCain-Feingold, on voting against the Bush tax cuts, etc. And these are his active supporters.
Nonetheless, 33% of those voting in the Republican primary in rock-ribbed conservative state of South Carolina went for McCain. I can only think of two possible explanations. One possibility is that McCain, despite his issues, was seen as being the best on the preeminent issue before the SC GOP electorate: the War. (With the very high military family population in SC, this isn’t too far from the truth, I believe.) Large numbers of conservatives in SC forgave McCain all of his “foibles” because he was right on the One Thing to Rule Them All. The other possibility is that McCain won over all of the moderate Republicans and independents in the SC primary. (More on this shortly)
Huckabee’s 30% is immensely significant. Fred Thompson simply tore apart Huckabee’s economic populism during the SC debate, and Huckabee simply couldn’t answer his charges. Huckabee’s positions are so different from classic conservative principles — including the class-warfare rhetoric he uses on stump speeches — that his strong second-place finish could only be explained by one of two things: “conservatism” no longer means what it used to mean, or social conservatives have become an identity politics group (which… probably means that “conservatism” no longer means what it used to mean).
Take a look at the exit polling data on some of these questions.
McCain won 47% of those who describe themselves as being liberal on most political issues, 51% of the moderates, and only 26% of the conservatives. 3 out of 4 SC voters who described themselves as “conservative” voted against McCain. And yet, they did not vote for Thompson or for McCain. Instead, 35% of them voted for Huckabee. Romney and Thompson together accounted for 35% — meaning that as many self-described conservatives voted for Huckabee (whose positions are not conservative, as that term used to mean) as did for the two candidates who espouse the most consistently conservative positions.
Further consider that 70% of the respondents said that it mattered “somewhat” or “a great deal” that the candidate shared their religious beliefs. That group went heavily for Huckabee: 50% in the “great deal” category and 29% of the “somewhat” category, with the combined result being that 40% of the 70% to whom the candidate’s religious beliefs matter went for Huckabee. That is, I submit, identity politics — a variety of politics I happen to be fairly conversant in. At least 40% of the 70% voted for the guy who was “most like them” as a person.
3. Rejection of the Commentariat
The final observation that I take away is that the 2008 SC primary showed the powerlessness of the conservative commentariat — and in particular, the irrelevance of the Internet.
Rush Limbaugh himself constantly attacked both McCain and Huckabee. Mark Levin’s hostility to McCain is well-known and well-documented. The blogosphere as a whole was pulling for Thompson with a fervor usually seen on the left side of the blogosphere. (Myself included.) Reports have been that the party elites really wanted Fred Thompson to be the GOP nominee. Thousands of trees, and billions of pixels gave their lives for the cause of promoting the Thompson candidacy.
None of it mattered.
And yes, one can always fall back on the “Thompson ran a terrible campaign” theme. That very well might be true. But one of the hallmarks of campaigning is to win over the so-called opinion makers and influencers. And the Thompson campaign did that in spades.
It did not matter.
I see this as a wholesale rejection of the conservative commentariat. The endorsements of various “powerful” organizations and entities did not matter. The support of various writers, media personalities, and the Blogosphere did not matter.
To some extent, this blog entry does not matter.
What does all this mean? Why the title?
Taken together, the conclusion I draw from the above three observations is that we have crossed the Rubicon in Republican politics.
There is no intellectual leadership in the Republican party — the intellectual commentariat is just an echo chamber of those of us who really care about discussing principles, philosophies, and policies. The voters themselves pay no attention to the commentariat, and vote accordingly.
You see, the converse of the “Thompson campaign sucked” is something like, “The McCain/Huckabee campaigns rocked!” The message, the inconsistency, the divergence from conservative principles — these things did not matter. What mattered was their organization, their GOTV, their TV advertising, their townhall meetings, etc. etc. — all of the process-oriented execution of a campaign. Whatever it is that the McCain & Huckabee campaigns did, it mattered more than the principles so beloved by the commentariat.
It mattered more to an enormous bloc of South Carolina voters that Huckabee’s personal religious beliefs were similar to their own than that his policies cohered with “conservative principles”.
In short, the results of S. C. show that it is the marketing, not the product, that counts.
If we lose in the general election vs. the Democrats, it will be because our candidate lacked organization, or didn’t have fire in the belly, or wasn’t displaying enough leadership, or ran a poor GOTV operation, or did not have the right zinger in the presidential debates. If we win, then it has nothing to do with the electorate coming to see that conservative principles are better than liberal ones — instead, it’s all about our machinery being better than theirs.
Politics is no longer about ideas and principles and policies, but about gameplan and execution. We don’t need the conservative commentariat, and thinktanks like Cato Institute. No — we need Bill Belichick.
Perhaps this has always been the case, and I was just naive in thinking that conservatism — and the contemporary Republican Party — was different.
When the Kerryites lost in 2004, and Al Gore lost in 2000, I thought it was because they believed the wrong things, and had wrong policies, and had no principles to speak of besides Wille zu Macht. The Dems thought it was because of the Bush organization machine, the insidious machinations of Karl “The Emperor” Rove, various dirty tricks, and the Vast Right Wing Conspiracy. Turns out, maybe the Dems were right. McLuhan has been right along — the medium is the message. The campaign is the message in today’s America.
Already, there are some who are calling for a ‘rebranding’ of the Republican Brand — as if it were AirTran and just needed a new logo and some new paint. Then there are others who believe that we need a new coalition for a new era, a new product for a changed marketplace.
Perhaps both are right.
Whoever our nominee is, and whether we win or lose in November, it does appear to me that today, after the SC primaries, conservatism is not about ideas, but about winning, or about identity, or about… well, whatever else a movement would be about once it transcends ideas and becomes about process and execution.
The disappointment that many of us Fredheads feel about the results of South Carolina has this sense of having crossed the ideological Rubicon. We know our candidate was flawed; we know his campaign wasn’t the Patriots offense. We thought, nonetheless, that he would win because the Republican Party — especially the conservatives within the party, well-represented in S. C. — would be about ideas and principles, not just the theatrics and the mechanics of campaigning. That may have been naive. In retrospect, it certainly seems so. Some of us (myself included) congratulate Sen. McCain and Gov. Huckabee for running a great campaign. None of that changes the pit-in-the-stomach feeling that we have crossed some important line, and have chosen — as a party, as a movement — that we will be about winning, about process, about campaigning.
We will be about marketing, not the product. And that, in some way, is the most tragic result of South Carolina.
-TS